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INTERNATIONAL LAW'S UNHELPFUL ROLE IN THE
SENKAKU ISLANDS
CARLOS RAMOS-MROSOVSKY*
"[T]here occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a
single day and night of misfortune all your warlike men in
a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like
manner disappeared in the depths of the sea."
Plato - Timaeus 1
1. INTRODUCTION
The Senkaku group consists of eight uninhabited islands, with
a total land area of less than seven square kilometers.2 They lie
roughly 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles
east of mainland China, and 240 nautical miles southwest of
Japanese Okinawa. 3  These specks of land are, however, of
immense economic and strategic importance. Under the
international law of the sea, control of the Senkakus may convey
exclusive economic rights to nearly 20,000 square nautical miles of
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Affairs, A.B. 2004; Harvard Law School, J.D. 2007. This Article could not have
been completed without the wise advice and encouragement of Gabriella Blum,
Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Special thanks are also owed
to Mr. Gabriel B. Collins of the United States Naval War College for his
translations from Chinese, as well as to Cmdr. Wayne R. Hugar (USN) and Dr.
Perry Pickert, both of the U.S. Joint Military Intelligence College, who generously
shared their time and insights with me. Last but not least, I thank my parents and
my wife, all three of whom learned more about the law of the sea than they might
have wished. Any merit in this Article must be shared with those who helped
make it possible. The errors are all my own.
1 PLATO, TIMAEUS 39 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Liberal Arts Press 1949) (360
BCE).
2 The Chinese call the islands "Diaoyutai" or "Tiaoyutai." For simplicity, this
Article uses the island group's more familiar Japanese name.
3 The islands are located between 25040, and 260 North, and 1230 and 124'
and 34' longitude. Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the
T'iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto), 15 CHINESE TAIWAN Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 9, 9 (1996-
97).
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undersea resources.4 Experts believe that hydrocarbon reserves
rivaling those of the Persian Gulf may lie beneath the surrounding
seas.5 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Japan and China both
claim sovereignty over the islands, one of Asia's most dangerous
strategic flashpoints for more than thirty years. Japan and China
dispute the sovereignty of the Senkakus and the surrounding seas
on the basis of rival interpretations of the treaties ending the Sino-
Japanese and Second World Wars, as well as of the customary
international law of territorial acquisition. 6 Despite the vast flow of
commerce and investment crossing the East China Sea, the islands'
unsettled status is a continuing source of tension between China
and Japan and frustrates a definitive demarcation of the overall
maritime boundary between the two countries. Although both
sides profess a commitment to solving their dispute peacefully,
efforts to reach a negotiated settlement have consistently failed. 7
Indeed, over the past three decades, Chinese and Japanese forces
have menaced each other in the disputed seas around the islands
4 See VICTOR PRESCOTr & CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL
BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 438 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD].
5 SELIG S. HARRISON, SEABED PETROLEUM IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CONFLICT OR
COOPERATION? 5-6 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2005),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Asia-petroleum.pdf.
6 The governments of both mainland China and Taiwan are in unusual
agreement that the Senkakus belong to China. Compare Statement on the Chinese
position toward the Ryukyu Islands and the T'iaoyutai Islets, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Uune 12, 1971) (declaring that "[tlhe
islets are affiliated with the Province of Taiwan and constitute a part of the
territory of the Republic of China") with Statement of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 30, 1971) (declaring that the islands
are "islands appertaining to Taiwan. Like Taiwan, they have been an inalienable
part of Chinese territory since ancient times.... The Chinese people are
determined to liberate Taiwan! The Chinese people are determined to recover the
Tiaoyu and other islands appertaining to Taiwan!"). For a translation of both of
these documents, see Chiu, supra note 3, at 13-17.
7 See Zhiguo Gao & Jilu Wu, Key Issues in the East China Sea: A Status Report
and Recommended Approaches, in SEABED PETROLEUM IN NORTHEAST ASIA: CONFLICT
OR COOPERATION? 32,37 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2005),
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Asia-petroleum.pdf ("The
East China Sea is perhaps one of the most complicated marine areas anywhere in
the world in terms of its overlapping claims, sovereign disputes over islands and
boundary delimitation. No progress has been achieved in negotiating bilateral
maritime boundaries over a long period of 35 years.").
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss4/2
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and even trained weapons.8 Deep-seated historical and cultural
antagonisms exacerbate the dispute.
Although the United States has avoided taking a position on
the question of "ultimate sovereignty" over the islands, the dispute
is nevertheless of serious concern to Americans.9 The United States
is pledged to defend Japan under the terms of a Mutual Security
Treaty which it interprets to apply to all "territories under the
administration of Japan." 1°  With 50,000 soldiers and sailors
permanently stationed in Japan, the United States would probably
be drawn into any conflict over the Senkakus." U.S. warships have
already participated in massive Japanese war games designed to
simulate operations to recapture the Senkakus from Chinese
forces.12
Both countries' arguments for sovereignty over the islands are
discussed below, but this Article does not presume to add to the
already vast body of scholarship purporting to solve the legal
puzzle of the islands' status.13 Instead, this Article argues that, at
least in the case of the Senkaku islands, the international law
regimes that might have been expected to guide the parties toward
8 See, e.g., Two Japanese Fighters Scramble Over Senkaku Islands, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Aug. 24, 1995; Chinese Research Ship Sighted Near Senkaku Isles, THE
DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), Feb. 5, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20070205TDY02008.htm.
9 Adam Ereli, State Dep't Deputy Spokesman, State Department Noon
Briefing, Mar. 24, 2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/news/2004/03/mil-040324-usia03.htm.
10 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11
U.S.T. 1632; Ereli, supra note 9.
11 U.S. Forces Japan Fact Sheet, http://www.usfj.mil/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2007). The 50,000 total includes personnel assigned to the U.S. Navy's Seventh
Fleet, much of which is based in Japan, but not under the U.S. Forces Japan
command structure. See Ereli, supra note 9.
12 More than a hundred ships from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) and the United States Navy participated in "Annualex 18G," a 2006
practice run for a naval conflict pitting China against the United States and Japan.
Joint Drill Based on Retaking Senkakus, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20061230a6.html. The thinly-veiled
premise of the exercise was that China, tactfully labeled "country orange," had
seized the Senkakus from Japan ("country blue"). Id. With help from the United
States ("country green"), Japan staged an amphibious operation to recapture the
islands. Id. As the Japan Times noted, this exercise was "the first to stage a mock
invasion by China of Japanese-controlled territory." Id.
13 Compare GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
MILITARY FORCE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 162-76 (1998) (arguing for "Japan's
Superior Rights in the Senkaku Islands") with Chiu, supra note 3, at 28 (concluding
that "the law apparently favors the Chinese side").
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a reasoned and peaceful settlement have, if anything, impeded a
lasting and legitimate settlement important to peace and security
in East Asia. Its conclusions may be especially timely at a time
when resource-driven maritime disputes are proliferating around
the globe.
This Article argues that the applicable international law
regimes have impeded a Sino-Japanese settlement over the
Senkakus in three key ways.
First, the one-size-fits-all approach of international legal
regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea ("UNCLOS") may sometimes be their most dangerous aspect.' 4
The Law of the Sea Convention's general rules are not tailored to,
and cannot easily accommodate, the unique political geography of
the East China Sea. By enabling whichever country has
sovereignty over the Senkakus to claim exclusive rights over
resources hundreds of miles offshore, the law of the sea has
inflamed the dispute by vesting otherwise worthless islands with
immense economic value.15
Second, the international customary law governing the
acquisition of territory encourages the "display of sovereignty"
and penalizes states for appearing to "acquiesce" in a rival state's
claim to disputed territory.' 6 When territories are disputed in an
atmosphere of passionate nationalism, as are the Senkakus, the
need to demonstrate sovereignty and avoid acquiescence - or the
appearance of acquiescence - in a rival's claim may prompt a series
of dangerous escalatory gestures.
Third, the vagueness of customary international law
simultaneously encourages parties to invoke international legal
norms which can almost always be construed to fit their interests,
while dissuading them from trying to resolve their dispute through
legal processes. Though many respected international scholars
assume that creating global judicial institutions will cause states to
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
15 UNCLOS arts. 56-57 allow a country to declare an "exclusive economic
zone" of up to 200 nautical miles from its coast, within which it may exercise
"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting... the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the.., seabed and its subsoil." Id.
16 See Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial





resolve their disputes before these institutions, or at least to
"bargain in the shadow of anticipated legal decisions," the
Senkakus present a counter-example.' 7 The malleability of the
available legal principles has allowed both China and Japan to
justify their claims to sovereignty by invoking international law,
even though neither has shown interest in having the islands'
status adjudicated on the merits by an international body. As will
be argued below, the unpredictability of litigation, the probable
domestic illegitimacy of any adverse result, and the lack of any
means short of force to enforce a judgment all work to discourage
litigation or arbitration. These same factors make it similarly
difficult for the parties to resolve their dispute by "bargaining in
the shadow" of international law and underscore the limited value
of the international judicial system in high-stakes cases.
The result is a stalemate which poses a serious threat to peace
in the region. As Japanese and Chinese demand for fossil fuels
continues to soar, the islands may become a progressively more
valuable prize.' 8 As such, the role of international legal regimes in
the Senkaku dispute should prompt reflection on the effectiveness
of global legal schemes in resolving resource conflicts in areas of
contested sovereignty.
In presenting the above arguments, this Article will proceed in
the following sequence. It will first explain the basic principles of
the relevant international legal regimes and describe how the
sovereignty dispute first arose. The Article will then evaluate the
legal merits of the Japanese and Chinese claims. Next, it will assess
the impact of international law on the dispute, arguing that global
legal regimes have enmeshed the division of the East China Sea's
undersea resources in emotional disagreements over entitlements
to sovereign territory, while neither encouraging nor enabling
either party to try to resolve the problem through the application
17 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 431-34 (2000) (noting that contracting
and negotiating costs are exceptionally high for legal agreements and that soft law
alternatives may be preferable).
18 China is the world's third-largest oil importer after the United States and
Japan. In 2006, China accounted for an estimated 38% increase in world oil
demand. See UNITED STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY
ANALYSIS BRIEF: CHINA (Aug. 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
cabs/China/Full.htmIl. Japan is the world's second-largest oil importer. UNITED
STATES ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF: JAPAN
(Dec. 2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Japan/Full.htm.
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of international law. This Article will conclude by reflecting on the
implications of international law's role in perpetuating the
stalemate over the Senkaku islands for other sovereignty and
resource disputes, as well as with some more general observations.
2. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES
Before continuing farther, it may be helpful to explain the
basics of the law relevant to the Senkaku islands dispute. The
international law of the sea vests the Senkaku islands with almost
all of their practical value.1 9 The law of the sea is one of the oldest
and most developed areas of public international law, and has
been extensively codified in the Law of the Sea Convention to
which Japan and China are both parties.20  The customary
international law of territorial acquisition probably determines
which country enjoys sovereignty over the Senkakus, although
China also advances arguments based on the treaties that ended
World War II in the Pacific.
2.1. Law of the Sea
The chief benefit of sovereignty over the Senkaku islands is
their presumed ability, under UNCLOS, to project areas of
maritime jurisdiction over the East China Sea. UNCLOS sets out a
system of geographic categories to balance national and
international rights over areas of ocean. The basic principle is that
a coastal state's authority over adjacent seas should be at a
maximum close to shore but diminish farther out to sea.21
19 The islands' strategic location may conceivably make them useful as radar
and missile platforms. See Diaoyu Islands: Inalienable Part of China's Territory,
Dep't. of English & Int'l Studies, China Foreign Affairs University, Aug. 15, 2006,
available at http://janson986.blog.hexun.com/4439776_d.html (expressing the
fear that if Japan were to place military bases on the Senkakus, the islands would
"become a time bomb placed at the gate of China").
20 Although one hundred and fifty-three countries have ratified UNCLOS,
the United States has not. See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the
Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions
to the Convention and the related Agreements as of Feb. 1 2008,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/chronological listsofratificatio
ns.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). The Convention was detested by American
conservatives who preferred to call it the "LOST" Treaty. See, e.g., Doug Bandow,
Don't Resurrect the Law of the Sea Treaty, POL'Y ANALYSIS No. 552 (2005), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa552.pdf (arguing that there is no benefit to
the United States ratifiying of the Law of the Sea Treaty).
21 This reflects a balance between the traditional alternatives of mare liberun
("freedom of the seas") and mare clausum as advocated by seventeenth-century
[Vol. 29:4
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UNCLOS accordingly specifies the rights and obligations of coastal
states with regard to a hierarchy of "zones" of ocean space.22 The
Convention in turn defines these zones by their distance from a
state's "baseline." 23 The low-tide line serves as a default baseline. 24
When, however, a coast is "deeply indented" or has "a fringe of
islands," UNCLOS permits countries to draw "straight baselines"
between "appropriate points."25 Archipelagic states may also draw
straight baselines "joining the outermost parts of their outermost
islands," provided that they do so in accordance with complex
geometric rules.26 The Convention allows islands to generate the
same offshore jurisdictional zones as mainland territories, so long
as the islands are not "rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own."27 Which bodies should
be considered rocks, and which islands, is often the subject of fierce
debate.28
jurists Hugo Grotius and John Selden, respectively. See generally HUGO GROTIUS,
MARE LIBERUM (1609); JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM, SEU, DE DoMINIO MARIS (1635).
22 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, at arts. 3 ("Territorial Sea"), 8 ("Internal
Waters"), 55-57 ("Exclusive Economic Zone") and 77-78 ("Continental Shelf").
See also PREscoTr & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 9-47.
23 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, at arts. 3 ("Territorial Sea"), 8 ("Internal
Waters"), 55-57 ("Exclusive Economic Zone"), and 77-78 ("Continental Shelf").
24 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 5 ("[T]he normal baseline.., is the low-
water line along the coast.").
25 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 7 ("In localities where the coastline is
deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points
may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured."). For the complex results of this practice around the
world, see PREscoTr & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 144-64.
26 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 47(1) ("An archipelagic State may draw
straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included
the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area
of land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1."). See also PRESCOTT &
SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 167-81.
27 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 121 ("(1) An island is a naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide[;] (2) Except
as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
territory[;] (3) Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.").
28 See PRESCOT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 58-89.
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UNCLOS defines the following bands of sea space, moving
outwards from the coast. Closest to land are internal waters,
which lie to landward of straight baselines. 29 States possess full
sovereign authority within their internal waters, just as they would
on shore.30 Next, states are entitled to claim a territorial sea
extending up to twelve nautical miles from the baseline.31 Within a
territorial sea, a state has full sovereignty over the seabed, water
column, surface and airspace, but must permit the "innocent
passage" of other countries' vessels.32 States are further entitled to
claim an exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") extending up to 200
nautical miles from the baseline, in which they enjoy "sovereign
rights" over the resources of the water column and the seabed, but
cannot restrict freedom of navigation, overflight, or the laying of
undersea cables.33  Finally, UNCLOS allows states to claim
authority over the seabed of their continental shelves. 34 Shelf
rights are frequently subsumed in EEZs, because UNCLOS
presumes that a country's continental shelf, like its EEZ, extends
200 nautical miles beyond the baseline.35 If, however, the "natural
prolongation" of a country's landmass extends beyond 200 nautical
miles, UNCLOS allows a country to define a wider continental
shelf, up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles from the baseline,
with clearance from the United Nations Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf.36 With this one minor exception, the High
29 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 8.
30 See id.
31 Id. at art. 3.
32 Id. at arts. 2-4; 17-33. See also PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 14-18.
33 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at arts. 55-58. See also PRESCOTr & SCHOFIELD, supra
note 4, at 19-23.
34 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at arts. 76-78. See also PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD,
supra note 4, at 13-26.
35 The actual undersea topography is irrelevant for the first 200 nautical miles
in delimited continental shelf claims. See UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 76 (1)
("The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to
a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance.")
36 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 76(1), (8) ("Information on the limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by the coastal State to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf .... The limits of the shelf




Seas begin after the 200 nautical mile EEZ limit.37 On the High
Seas, all states may navigate freely and exploit natural resources
and none may claim sovereignty or jurisdiction.38
UNCLOS' seemingly clear framework is extremely difficult to
apply in practice. In any sea less than 400 nautical miles across,
areas of maritime jurisdiction will overlap. The East China Sea is
only 360 nautical miles across at its widest point. UNCLOS is
vague about how to resolve overlapping EEZ or continental shelf
claims, instructing only that "the delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone [or continental shelf] between States with opposite
or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law.., in order to achieve an equitable solution."39
In this respect, UNCLOS is much fuzzier than its predecessor,
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which was
in effect when the Senkakus dispute first erupted.40  The
Continental Shelf Convention provided that "in the absence of
agreement... the boundary shall be determined by application of
the principle of equidistance... "41 By contrast, adjudicators
applying UNCLOS may consider all sorts of non-geographic
factors in settling overlapping EEZ claims.42  Nevertheless,
geography remains the "dominant factor" in maritime boundary
delimitation.43 Dividing EEZ claims along a line equidistant from
the relevant baselines is still the most popular and straightforward
method of determining maritime boundaries. 44  International
and binding."). See also PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 24.
37 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 86 (stating that the high seas include "all
parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of
an archipelagic State").
38 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at art. 87(1) ("The high seas are open to all States,
whether coastal or land-locked."). See also PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at
27-29.
39 UNCLOS, supra note 14, at arts. 74(1) (discussing the EEZ) and 83(1)
(discussing the continental shelf).
40 Continental Shelf Convention art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311, 312, (entered into force June 10, 1964) [hereinafter "Continental Shelf
Convention"].
41 Id. at art. 6(2).
42 See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 18 (June 3)
("[Dielimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable principles and
taking account of all relevant circumstances in order to achieve an equitable
result.").
43 PRESCOrT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 221.
44 See Leonard Legault & Blair Hankey, Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency,
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courts have recognized the continuing strength of the equidistance
principle in deciding recent maritime boundary cases: the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) favors a two-stage approach in
which the Court first defines a provisional equidistant line and
then considers whether special circumstances require its equitable
adjustment.45 The equidistant or "median" line thus remains the
fundamental starting point in the adjudication or negotiation of
maritime boundaries. 46
Sovereignty over the Senkaku islands is therefore a hugely
important factor in the delimitation of the maritime boundary
between China and Japan in the narrow East China Sea. Taking
what seems to be the prevailing view among international legal
commentators -that at least some members of the Senkaku group
are full islands capable of projecting an EEZ-the group's value as
base points for Chinese or Japanese maritime claims is evident.47 If
the maritime boundary between China and Japan were to be
drawn along an equidistant median line, sovereignty over the
Senkakus could determine control over 19,800 square nautical
miles of sea and seabed.48
and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in 1 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
BOUNDARIES 203, 203-215 (Jonathan Charney & Lewis Alexander eds., 1993)
(observing that "equidistance has been the only serious contender for acceptance
as a preferred or privileged method" of maritime boundary delimitation, and
finding that of surveyed delimitations between opposite coasts, fifty-five
boundaries, or eighty-nine percent, are based on the "equidistance method").
45 See Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 58 (June 14) (favoring an "equidistance-special
circumstances rule" for maritime delimitations); Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bah.) 2001 I.C.J. 40, 111
(Mar. 16) (stating that the court "will first provisionally draw an equidistance line
and then consider whether there are circumstances which must lead to an
adjustment of that line.").
46 The two possible equidistance lines in the Senkaku Islands dispute are
shown in a map included in PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 627.
47 See PRESCOTT & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 437 ("The Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku
Islands consist of five islands and three rocks .... ."); William B. Heflin,
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans Apart, 18 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. 1, 2 (2000) (describing the Senkaku islands as "five small volcanic islands
and three rocky outcroppings"); Steven Wei Su, The Tiaoyu Islands and Their
Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation between China and Japan, 3
CHINESE J. INT'L L. 385, 398 (2004) (stating that at least two of the Senkakus are
"non-rock islands").
48 PREScoTr & SCHOFIELD, supra note 4, at 438 ("The two lines of
equidistance.., enclose an area of 19,800 sq. nm (67,800 sq. km) and almost all of




The Senkakus are also important with respect to China's
insistence that its continental shelf rights extend, by "natural
prolongation," to the "Okinawa Trough"49 ("Trough"). The
Trough is a deep chasm in the sea floor, just west of and parallel to
Japan's Ryukyu islands and a considerable distance to the east of
the Senkakus. Sovereignty over the islands would extend Japan's
maritime jurisdiction across this putative natural boundary and
thus seriously undermine China's claim that the Trough forms a
"natural" boundary. Even if UNCLOS calls for the Sino-Japanese
maritime boundary to be determined "equitably," the Trough and
the median line are the intuitive choices. If Japanese sovereignty
over the Senkakus pushes the boundary west of the Trough, then
the median line is the presumptive boundary. On the other hand,
Chinese sovereignty over the Senkakus would reinforce the
position that the Trough represents the end of China's "natural
extension." 50
2.2. The Customary International Law of Territorial Acquisition
There is no international convention as to how states should
acquire sovereignty over disputed territories. Customary
international law nevertheless recognizes at least five "modes of
territorial acquisition" which have emerged from the decisions of
international judicial bodies and arbitral panels: discovery and
occupation, cession, accretion, conquest, and prescription.51 These
modes or theories of territorial acquisition generally guide
tribunals considering questions of sovereignty. Specific
agreements reached in treaties will of course override these
background rules. Three of these modes-discovery and
occupation, cession, and prescription- arguably apply to the
Senkaku islands.
The first and most important is discovery and occupation.
Occupation is the usual means for a state to gain sovereignty over
a territory that was previously terra nullius, that is, territory
belonging to no sovereign. Under customary international law,
49 ZHANG YAOGUANG & Liu KAI, LIAONING NORMAL UNIVERSITY MARITIME
ECONOMIC SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER, A STUDY OF EAST SEA OIL
AND GAS RESOURCES AND THE CHINA-JAPAN EAST SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF
DEMARCATION DISPUTE 5 (Gabriel B. Collins trans., 2006) (claiming that the Trough
is the "natural dividing line" between China and Japan).
50 Id.
51 Lee, supra note 16, at 1-2.
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discovery alone is not enough to give sovereignty over a body of
land.52  Sovereign title can only be created by affirmative
demonstration of intent to occupy (animus occupandi) a territory.5 3
To preserve a sovereign title, occupation must be "effective." What
counts as "effective" title can vary widely. International courts and
arbitrators have described effective occupation as containing two
elements: the intention to act as a sovereign (animus occupandi) and
the actual exercise of sovereign authority.54  They have also
recognized that different levels of state activity are appropriate for
different types of territory: minimal levels of government activity
may be enough to demonstrate sovereignty over uninhabited
areas.55
A wide range of government activities have been recognized as
evidence, or effectivitds, of sovereignty. A non-exhaustive list
includes military patrols, regulation of trading, mining or other
economic activity, authorizing scientific expeditions, investigating
52 See SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL AcQUIsmION, DISPUTES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (1997) (stating tha symbolic possession was also
required to give sovereignty).
53 Id. at 47-50. Raising a flag or a cross or building a fort or a settlement are
all classic methods of displaying the requisite animus occupandi.
54 It is not enough for a state to have an inchoate title through discovery of a
territory. It must take affirmative steps to cement that title. See Island of Palmas
Arbitration (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 846 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)
(holding that sovereign rights created at the time of an island's discovery could
only be preserved through "continuous and peaceful" exercise). The dispute
concerned an island lying between the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. The
U.S. had acceded to Spanish rights in the Philippines after the Spanish American
War. The Permanent Court of Arbitration held that acquiring sovereignty over a
territory requires "effective occupation" and a "continuous and peaceful" display
of authority over that territory. Id. See also Eritrea v. Yemen, 22 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 211, 268 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998), available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil-id=458 ("The modern international law of the
acquisition (or attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an
intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the exercise of
jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and peaceful basis."); Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 563 (Sept.
11) (requiring "peaceful and continuous" exercise of State functions).
55 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 43, at 50-51 (Apr. 5) ("[Blearing in mind.., the Arctic and inaccessible
character of the uncolonized parts of the country, the King of Denmark and
Norway displayed during the period from the founding of the colonies by Hans
Egede in 1721 up to 1814 his authority to an extent sufficient to give his country a
valid claim to sovereignty ...."). See also Advisory Opinion on the Status of
Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 43 (Oct. 16) (stating that in the case of claims to
sovereignty over thinly populated or unsettled areas "very little in the way of




criminal activity, holding judicial proceedings, registering deeds to
property, building infrastructure, census-taking, and maintaining
navigational markers.5 6 Only government action can serve as
evidence of sovereignty. Private commercial activity by citizens of
a claimant state will not suffice, although its regulation by a
government will.57 When two countries claim the same territory,
international tribunals will compare the degree of sovereign
authority demonstrated by each claimant to reach a result.58 This
kind of balancing analysis seems to be the preferred method of
international tribunals and will probably carry the day against
contrary arguments based on irredentist history and ancient
documents.59
Cession is a method for transferring sovereignty between
sovereigns, in which one state voluntarily renounces its sovereign
rights in a territory in favor of those of another sovereign.60 Even
though international law defines cession as a "peaceful transfer,"
the threat of force sometimes hangs over territorial cession. As one
scholar explains, cession is "the common manner of disposing of
territories of a defeated state" and is usually achieved by treaty.61
Prescription is the most complex of the customary modes of
territorial acquisition. Under this mode, a state that fails to contest
other states' assertions of sovereignty over its territory can lose its
rights for failure to insist upon them.62 A state failing to protest
56 See Lee, supra note 16, at 4-8 (discussing various modes of territorial
acquisition). See also SHARMA, supra note 52, at 74-75, 85-94 (discussing
determining factors in sovereignty disputes).
57 See, e.g., Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v.
Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, 683 (Dec. 17) (observing that although Indonesia states
that the waters around Ligitan and Sipadan have traditionally been used by
Indonesian fishermen, "activities by private persons cannot be seen as effectivitis if
they do not take place on the basis of official regulations or under governmental
authority.").
58 The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (U.K. v. Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17)
(comparing the extent of British and French sovereign activity on disputed
Channel islands).
59 Id. at 57 ("What is... decisive.., is not indirect presumptions deduced
from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the
possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.").
60 SHARMA, supra note 52, at 136-41 (noting that disputes concerning cessions
are infrequent but may arise about the interpretation of relevant agreements, and
especially the extent of the territory ceded).
61 Lee, supra note 16, at 8.
62 SHARMA, supra note 52, at 118-19 ("[If the adversary of any affected or
interested state does not challenge the exercise of sovereignty over a prolonged
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another's invasion of its sovereign rights may be deemed to have
acquiesced to a rival's sovereignty over the territory in question.63
Maps can be important in establishing territorial acquisition by
prescription or acquiescence. If a government acknowledges the
accuracy of a map, it may be held to the demarcation of sovereign
rights depicted therein.64 Prescriptive acquisition of sovereignty is
analogous to the common law doctrine of adverse possession but it
is much less reliable in its operation. Most importantly, customary
international law has not congealed solidly enough to indicate how
many years must pass without protest from a prior sovereign for
its title to lapse. 65 There may also be a presumption against finding
that a claim has lapsed.66 Nor does customary international law
appear to have recognized hardship as an excuse for a country's
failure to protest a rival's invasion of its sovereign rights.67
Transfers of sovereignty by prescription may thus lack legitimacy
in the eyes of a dispossessed state.
period, the exclusive display of sovereignty is proved and the title acquires
absolute validity.").
63 See, e.g., Clipperton Island Arbitration Award (Fr. v. Mex.) Uan 28, 1931) in
26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 393 (1932) (noting that Mexico was deemed, in 1931, to have
lost any title it held in a disputed island for failure to respond to a French naval
officer's 1858 declaration of sovereignty in a Honolulu newspaper, made during
the course of his circumnavigation of the world).
64 See, e.g., Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.C.J. 17 (May
26) (noting that Thailand's failure to take exception to the boundaries depicted in
maps formally presented by French colonial authorities was considered
acquiescence to the boundaries therein depicted).
65 See, e.g., SHARMA, supra note 52, at 109, 118 (explaining that the customary
rule requires nothing more exact than the passage of "a reasonable time" or a
"prolonged period").
66 See Seokwoo Lee, Territorial Disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan
Concerning the Senkaku Islands, 3 BOUNDARY AND TERRITORY BRIEFING 7, at 23-24
(2002) (suggesting that the length of time that must pass "varies according to the
circumstances, including: the urgency of the need for governmental control in the
area [and] the degree of control exercised in the area by a rival state"); see also D.P.
O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 444 (1970) ("where the intention to abandon
territory is established and unquestionable then the presumption is rebutted, but
there are few instances where this is the case"), quoted in Lee, supra note 66, at 24.
67 See, e.g., Clipperton Island Arbitration Award, supra note 63. Given the
limited communications technology of the time, Mexico could not reasonably
have had notice of territorial claims published in the Honolulu newspapers of
1858. Indeed, King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, who arbitrated the case,
acknowledged that the "regularity" of the French occupation "has also been
questioned because the other Powers were not notified of it," but decided in




3. ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE
Only recently, however, has the bearing of these legal
principles upon the Senkaku islands attracted much interest. For
centuries, sovereignty over the Senkaku islands would hardly have
seemed a great prize. Chinese sailors used the islands as a
navigational marker as early as the fourteenth century.68 China
never made any attempt to settle on the islands, however, nor to
formally mark them as its territory. 69  In 1895, the Japanese
government declared that the islands had until then been terra
nullius, and announced their formal annexation to Japan.70 The
islands were then essentially forgotten. At the end of World War
II, Japan conceded that U.S. authorities should administer the
Senkakus.71 The United States returned the islands to Japanese
administration in 1972.72
The Senkakus only became important after a 1968 study by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
suggested that vast quantities of oil and gas might lie beneath the
East China Sea. 73 The most promising area identified was "a
200,000 square kilometer area just north of Taiwan, or almost
exactly the location" of the Senkaku islands.74 Little actual drilling
has taken place to this day, but some estimates suggest that as
many as 100 billion barrels of oil and 200 trillion cubic feet of gas
68 See UNRYU SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-
JAPANESE RELATIONS: IRREDENTISM AND THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS 45-51 (2000)
(analyzing records of fourteenth century sailing missions).
69 See Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku)
Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J. INT'L. L. 221, 260 (1974)
(observing that "Chinese officials had never demonstrated any intent to occupy
[the Senkakus]; nor had they ever actually taken possession of them in the name
of their sovereign").
70 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, THE BASIC VIEW ON THE SOVEREIGNTY
OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (Mar. 8, 1972), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/senkaku/senkaku.htm.
71 They did so pursuant to Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
which granted the United States sole "trusteeship" of the Nansei and Ryukyu
islands. Treaty of Peace with Japan (U.S.-Japan) art. 3, Sept. 8,1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169.
72 Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 446.
73 See K.O. Emery et al., Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of
the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, 2 UNECAFE/CCOP TECH. BULL. 3 (1969),
discussed in Chiu, supra note 3, at 11 n.4.
74 Chiu, supra note 3, at 11.
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may be at stake.75 The United Nations survey thus linked
sovereignty over the Senkakus with control of potentially
enormous undersea resources. Control of the islands might allow
their owners to declare valuable offshore zones and to use the
islands as base points in delimiting a favorable maritime
boundary.
76
China, like Japan, was and remains highly dependent on
imported oil. Chinese leaders are determined to guard against this
economic and strategic vulnerability. 77 Thus, mere months before
the Senkakus were scheduled to return to Japanese administration,
China remembered them. The Chinese Foreign Ministry fiercely
condemned the "sheer and outright gangster logic" by which
Japan justified its sovereignty over the islands.78 The Senkakus, it
insisted, "have been China's territory since ancient times." 79
3.1. A Dangerous Rivalry
Tensions over the islands have simmered ever since. The
strength of opposing nationalisms within the domestic politics of
both countries contributes hugely to the parties' inability to set the
sovereignty issue aside and cooperate in developing the East China
Sea's energy resources.
Unfortunately, appeals to sovereignty and territorial integrity
have "intense symbolic value" in China and Japan. 0 Japanese
aggression during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries makes
Japan especially resented in China.81  The Chinese public
remembers Japan's brutality during World War II and bridles at
75 See HARRISON, supra note 5, at 5.
76 When the dispute first arose, the 1958 Shelf Convention, represented the
relevant international law. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 40.
Although UNCLOS was different from the Shelf Convention in many respects, the
basic principle of valuable offshore areas attaching to sparsely or non-inhabited
the islands was a feature of both treaties. See id. At arts. 1-2 (defining and
delineating states' rights in regards to the continental shelf).
77 See generally MARITIME IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S ENERGY STRATEGY: INTERIM
REPORT (Gabriel B. Collins, et al.) (forthcoming 2008).
78 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of
China, Dec. 30, 1971, translated in Chiu, supra note 3, at 16.
79 Id.
80 Erica Strecker Downs & Phillip C. Saunders, Legitimacy and the Limits of
Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands, 23 INT'L. SECURITY 114, 118 (1998).
81 Id. See also PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA'S NEW NATIONALISM 69 (2004) ("For
over half a century ... 'defeating the Japanese and saving the nation' has been a




Japan's unapologetic attitude to its recent history. 82 The Chinese
government encourages this attitude. HavLig abandoned
communism, the Chinese Communist regime has justified its rule
on the twin pillars of economic growth and regaining the world's
respect for China's power after two centuries of colonial
humiliation.8 3 It has often played on anti-Japanese sentiment to
draw attention away from domestic failures and buttress its own
political legitimacy.8 4 Having done much to encourage such
attitudes, China's government cannot easily ignore them.85
Similar political forces are at work in Japan. Many Japanese
believe that with the world's second-largest economy and fifth-
largest military, it is time for their country to resume its place as an
"ordinary global power" on the world stage.86 Many others,
however, are uncomfortable with their country's moving beyond
its pacifist postwar constitution. 87 Advocates of rearmament and
national pride succeed best politically when they can point to a
rival that the public should, perhaps quite reasonably, fear. The
result is that "China-bashing" has become "a winning formula in
Japanese domestic politics." 88  With Japanese armed forces
82 The Japanese have not excelled at building bridges to their neighbors. See,
e.g., Sebastian Moffett, Japan's Koizumi Again Irks China with Shrine Visit, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 15, 2006, at A6 (presenting recent conflict between China and Japan);
Bruce Wallace, Abe is Adamant on Sex Slaves Comment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at
A12 (documenting current ill will between the Japanese and North Koreans).
83 Downs & Saunders, supra note 80, at 120.
84 See Ian Bremmer, East Asia's Giants Slip Out of Control: The Rift Between
China and Japan, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 20, 2005, at 6 (noting that in 2004 there
were some 47,000 public demonstrations against Chinese authorities and that
encouraging anti-Japanese nationalism has helped redirect Chinese public opinion
away from low standards of living).
85 Downs & Saunders, supra note 80, at 126 (explaining that "perceived
failure.., to defend China's territorial claims vigorously" exposes the
government to public criticism and has "a negative impact on the regime's
legitimacy"). See also GRIES, supra note 81, at 121, 125 (arguing that "a popular
nationalism is now emerging in China that increasingly challenges the Party-
state" and that "because popular nationalism can threaten the party's legitimacy,
it is an increasingly significant constraint on China's Japan policy").
86 See, e.g., TAKASHI INOGUCHI, JAPANESE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 180, 201
(2005) (describing how, in Japanese politics, a more assertive foreign policy has
developed alongside a rise in national feeling).
87 See id. at 199-200 (describing the continued strength of pacifist attitudes in
Japanese politics and foreign policy).
88 Bremmer, supra note 84 (arguing that "reinvigorating Japanese nationalism
at China's expense" helps keep Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
power). See also J. Sean Curtin, Anti-China Fear and Loathing in Japan, ASIA TIMES,
May 4, 2005.
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deployed overseas for the first time since World War II, the
nationalists appear to be in the ascendant in modern Japanese
politics.8 9 Chinese saber rattling over the Senkakus tends only to
justify their arguments for a stronger Japanese military and a more
robust foreign policy.
Thus, if either government were to yield on the Senkakus, it
would almost certainly be accused of betraying the nation to a
detested and feared rival. It is difficult for an American observer
to comprehend the intensity of nationalist feelings in Japan and
China.90 Private citizens in both countries are deeply committed to
ideologies of national pride. Protests against insults to the national
honor can draw tens of thousands of participants.91 With regard to
the Senkakus in particular, nationalist groups have repeatedly
taken direct action to vindicate their countries' sovereign claims.
Private Chinese and Taiwanese organizations have made repeated
attempts to land on the islands and clashed with the Japanese
Coast Guard.92 Pro-China protestors have been taken into custody
by Japanese authorities.93 At least one protestor drowned after
jumping into the ocean when Japanese coast guards would not let
89 See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, End of an Era as Japan Enters Iraq, THE GUARDIAN,
Jul. 26, 2003, at 15.
90 Interesting insights into Japanese and Chinese attitudes can be gained by
visiting online discussion boards popular in East Asia. Some of these are written
in English, which serves as a common language. The discussion of an article
entitled "Japan downplays China's protest over Senkaku Islands" at Japan Today
suggests an impressive amount of public engagement with the Senkaku issue.
Online posters argue passionately about the proper extent of China's EEZ,
whether the Senkakus are islands, and how the doctrine of territorial prescription
may work. This is not a site for experts, but it is difficult to imagine American
internet users debating a question of international law quite so passionately. The
exchanges get ugly quickly. One poster declares that China should "send troops
to the diao yus and see what japan [sic] does to [black up its "jurisdiction"... if
the [J]apanese coast guard interferes," he writes, "we have the intemationa[l] oil
conglomerate and the PLAN to back up their work. There is no need to argue, just
do it." Posting of mikel to http://www.japantoday.com/jp/news/327386/all
(Feb. 13, 2005, 12:27).
91 See GRIES, supra note 81, at 15. (showing tens of thousands of students
protesting the Belgrade bombings in 1999).
92 See, e.g., Taiwanese Activists Turn Back After Japan Warns Them Not to Land on
Disputed Islands, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 2006; Japan Warned to Stay Clear of
Diaoyus Mission, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Oct. 25, 2006, at 3; Reiji Yoshida,
H.K. Activist Boat Turned Back from Senkakus, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Oct. 28, 2006.
93 Japan Arrests Chinese on Disputed Islands, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Mar. 24,
2004; China Demands "Unconditional" Release of Island Invaders, MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 25, 2004.
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him land on the islands.94 The Japanese government has never
used lethal force against these groups, but it is not difficult to
imagine matters getting out of hand.
Japanese nationalist organizations have kept pace. They too
have staged landings on the islands. Building and maintaining
lighthouses on the islands as a display of sovereignty is a favorite
tactic of these organizations. 95 Despite fierce Chinese protests, the
Japanese government has been unwilling to disown these
structures.96  Instead, the islands have become a popular
destination for Japanese politicians looking to bolster their patriotic
credentials. 97 Other incidents have been more serious. In April of
2004, a Japanese right-wing activist rammed a bus into the Chinese
consulate in Osaka, Japan, in protest of China's claims to the
Senkakus.9
8
Military posturing in the seas around the Senkakus, which
Japanese forces regularly patrol, is even more alarming. In 1978,
China reacted to a Japanese government statement dismissing
Chinese claims to the islands as "useless," by surrounding the
islands with more than 100 armed fishing boats.99 As China's
naval capacity has improved, it has deployed more advanced
survey vessels and warships to underscore its claim.100 Perhaps the
most dangerous incident occurred in November 2004, when a
nuclear-powered submarine of China's People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN), entered Japanese-claimed waters near the
Senkakus.101 The JMSDF went on full alert for only the second time
94 Michael Sheridan, Televised Death Raises Anger in China Sea Row, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Sept. 29, 1996.
95 See, e.g., Chinese Activists Protest Japanese Takeover of Senkaku Lighthouse,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005 (describing the origins of the nationalized
lighthouse).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., Governor Gets Involved in Senkaku Islands Feud, JAPAN UPDATE, Mar.
16, 2007, http://www.japanupdate.com/?id=7446 (describing the governor of
Okinawa's intention to make an inspection tour of the Senkakus).
98 Man Gets 7 Yrs in Prison for Attacking Osaka Chinese Consulate, KYODo NEWS,
Sept. 26, 2005.
99 David Tretiak, The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,
18 ASIAN SURV. 1235, 1241-42 (Dec. 1978).
100 See, e.g., Chinese Ships Spotted off Senkaku Islands, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
May 16, 1999, at 2; 5 Chinese Naval Ships Spotted Near E. China Sea Gas Field, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 9, 2005; Chinese Research Ship Detected in Japan's Economic
Zone, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 5, 2007.
101 David Pilling, Japanese Demand an Apology from China, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2004, at 9, available at http:/ / search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=%22Ryutaro+
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since World War II and chased the submarine with destroyers and
aircraft. The Chinese Foreign Ministry later explained that the
submarine had entered the area during a training mission for
"technical reasons." 102
These incidents are likely to continue. 0 3 Indeed, while both
countries have abstained from developing hydrocarbon sources in
disputed areas of the East China Sea, the China National Overseas
Oil Company (CNOOC) recently began producing natural gas
from a field north of the Senkakus, just inside the Chinese side of
the median line claimed by Japan.10 4 Japan may be in the earlier
stages of similar moves in its claimed EEZ.1°5 The possibility of
military protection for Japanese drilling operations has been
floated in the Japanese press.10 6 These developments suggest that
both sides are impatient to exploit the area's energy resources and
may grow increasingly impatient with waiting to resolve their
differences over the Senkakus before doing so. Unfortunately,
greater activity in the disputed waters will only raise the likelihood
of hostile encounters.
4. LEGAL BASICS OF THE COMPETING CLAIMS
4.1. Japan's Legal Claims
Japan advances three main arguments for its sovereignty over
the Senkakus. It justifies its claim to sovereignty over the islands
Hashimoto%22&page=4&id=041113001201&ct=0&nclickcheck=1.
102 Mark Magnier, China Regrets Sub Incident, Japan Says: Tokyo Asserts that
Beijing has Apologized for an Intrusion by its Nuclear-Powered Vessel, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2004, at A3.
103 This article does not presume to provide an exhaustive listing of these
kinds of incidents. Indeed, and especially with regard to military-to-military
encounters, such a list may not even be obtainable.
104 East China Sea Gas Field in Full Output: CNOOC, JAPAN TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2006,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20060805a7.html; Takashi
Hirokawa & Shigero Sato, Japan Asks China to Halt Gas Output in Disputed Field,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601101&sid=aKIOhFCXLWSk&refer=japan. China has at least temporarily
scaled back these activities, in large part, it is thought, "to ensure a peaceful
backdrop for the Beijing Olympics." Xu Yihe, Olympian Effort to Keep the Peace,
UPSTREAM, Mar. 28, 2008.
105 Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Time for Japan to Shut Up and Drill: Energy Expert,





on the grounds of occupation and discovery, effective exercise of
sovereignty, and Chinese acquiescence.
First, Japan argues that the Senkakus were terra nullius, or no-
man's land, before it took sovereignty over them.107 According to
the Japanese government, repeated surveys between 1885 and 1895
confirmed "that the islands were not only uninhabited but without
any trace of control by China."10 8 The Japanese government made
a cabinet-level decision to incorporate the islands into Japan on
January 14, 1895, and ordered the erection of a marker on the
islands, declaring that they were Japanese territory and formally
indicating Japan's animus occupandi.0 9 Japan's position is that the
islands have been Japanese territory ever since." 0
Second, Japan argues that it has exercised effective sovereignty
over the islands. Japan has regulated economic activity on the
islands by leasing them to private businessmen collecting guano
and bird feathers."' The Japanese government has also built a
weather station and a heliport, conducted land surveys, and
policed the islands." 2  Japanese coast guards patrol the
surrounding waters. These government activities, Japan argues,
demonstrate Japan's peaceful and continuous authority over the
islands. 13
Third, Japan argues that even if China once had rights over the
Senkakus, it had long acquiesced in Japan's sovereignty over the
islands when it made its first protest in 1971. Neither the People's
Republic nor Taiwan, the Japanese insist, ever objected to Japan's
107 THE BASIC VIEW ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, supra note
70. See also Chiu, supra note 3, at 17-18. Chiu's translation reads more smoothly
than the one on the Ministry's website.
108 Chiu, supra note 3, at 17.
109 Id.
110 See id. (citing, inter alia, an 1895 Cabinet Decision to erect a marker on the
Senkakus to formally incorporate them into the territory of Japan).
111 See Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.,
2002 I.C.J. 625, para. 145 (Dec. 17) ("[M]easures taken to regulate and control the
collecting of turtle eggs and the establishment of a bird reserve must be seen as
regulatory and administrative assertions of authority over territory which is
specified by name.").
112 See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, para. 197 (Mar. 16) ("The construction of
navigational aids.., can be legally relevant in the case of very small islands.").
113 See Eritrea v. Yemen, 22 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 211, 268 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1998), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil-id=458 (discussing
criteria for peaceful and continuous authority).
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control of the islands before the region's hydrocarbon potential
surfaced in the late 1960s." 4 Indeed, the Japanese point to a
number of twentieth century Chinese textbooks, from both the
mainland and Taiwan, which appear to recognize the Senkaku
islands as Japanese territory.115 The implication of this argument is
that China had no interest in the Senkakus, since as a victorious
ally in World War II, it could have had them if it wanted.
Japan takes pains to distinguish the Senkakus from the
territories that it seized from China under the 1895 Treaty of
Shimonoseki at the end of the Sino-Japanese War." 6 Japan argues
that its annexation of the Senkakus from a condition of terra nullius
was legally independent of its contemporaneous seizure of Chinese
territories.117 This is an important distinction because the World
War II-era Cairo and Potsdam Declarations both required Japan to
return territories it had seized from China.118 Japan agreed to the
114 See THE BASIc VIEW ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, supra
note 70 ("The fact that China expressed no objection to the status of the Islands
being under the administration of the United States under Article III of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty clearly indicates that China did not consider the Senkaku
Islands as part of Taiwan. It was not until the latter half of 1970, when the
question of the development of petroleum resources on the continental shelf of the
East China Sea came to the surface, that the Government of China and Taiwan
authorities began to raise questions regarding the Senkaku Islands."). See
generally SHARMA, supra note 52, at 118 (discussing the "judicial trend of putting
increasing emphasis on the absence of rival acts or claims of sovereignty").
115 See Temple of Preah Vihar (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.C.J. 17 (May 26).
For a discussion of the specific books, see Lee, supra note 66, at 11.
116 Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, art. 2, Apr. 17, 1895, 181 Consol. T.S. 217,
available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/1895shimonoseki-treaty.
htm#Treaty. Article 2 provides that "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full
sovereignty... the island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or
belonging to the said island of Formosa." Taiwan and China argue that this
included the Senkakus, to which the Shimonoseki Treaty makes no explicit
reference. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing the circumstances
surrounding the signing of the peace ptreaty).
117 See THE BASic VIEW ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS, supra
note 70 ("These islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores
Islands which were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty of China in accordance
with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which came into effect in May of
1895.").
118 The Cairo Declaration provided that "all the territories Japan has stolen
from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be
returned to the Republic of China." Conference of President Roosevelt,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa,
U.S.-U.K.-P.R.C., Dec. 1, 1943, DEP'T ST. BULL., 391, 393 [hereinafter The Cairo
Declaration]. See also First Cairo Conference, U.S.-U.K.-P.R.C., Nov. 26, 1943, 3
BEVANS 858 (1968) (demonstrating the unified goal of the unconditional surrender
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss4/2
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terms of both declarations when it surrendered to China and the
other allied powers at the end of World War II." 9 If Japan is
correct that the Senkakus were terra nullius prior to 1895, the
islands would have been properly excluded from the parcel of
territories returned to China in 1945.
4.2. China's Legal Claims
China defends its sovereignty over the Senkakus with three
main arguments of its own. China claims that it had already
exercised effective sovereignty over the islands long before their
annexation by Japan and that Japan tacitly acknowledged its rights
over the Senkakus. China also argues that the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations applied to the Senkaku islands and should supersede
any customary international law reasoning that supports Japan's
claim.120
First, China claims that it, not Japan, discovered and wielded
sovereignty over the islands since at least the fourteenth century.
The historical record shows that Chinese sailors of the sixteenth
century used the islands as navigational reference points when
sailing to collect tribute from the "Liuqiu Kingdom" of Okinawa
and in defining coastal defense districts for use against Japanese
pirates.'21 They fished in the surrounding waters, and sometimes
used the islands as shelter from storms.122 The Chinese have also
used the islands as a traditional source of shi cong yong (statice
arbuscula), a rare herb used in Chinese medicine.123 Indeed, in 1893,
the Dowager Empress Ci Xi is said to have granted the islands to a
Dr. Sheng Xuan-hui in appreciation of his services in gathering the
of Japan). The Potsdam Declaration incorporated the Cairo Declaration and
announced that Japan's sovereignty would be limited to its four main islands and
such minor islands as the allies determined. Proclamation Defining Terms For
Japanese Surrender, U.S.-U.K.-China, July 26, 1945, 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 135, 137
[hereinafter The Potsdam Declaration].
119 Instrument of Surrender by Japanese, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733, 139
U.N.T.S. 387.
120 See The Cairo Declaration, supra note 118, at 393 (noting that Japan should
be stripped of all Pacific islands it "stole[]" from China); The Potsdam
Declaration, supra note 118, at 137 (providing that the Cairo Declaration "should
be carried out").
121 See SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 47-61 (referencing navigation); 61-68
(referencing naval defense).
122 See Cheng, supra note 69, at 258 (noting that the Tiao-yu-tai Islands were
often used by Chinese fishermen during emergencies).
123 Id. at 257.
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herb to treat her illness.1 24 Such an act which would presuppose,
and might in a sense declare, Chinese sovereignty over the
islands. 25  These may seem relatively weak exercises of
governmental authority over the islands, but defenders of China's
claim would argue that they suffice in light of the kind of territory
at stake.126 On this view, China used the islands "for centuries for
the only purpose for which they are suited, as a navigational aide
and source of medicinal herbs."
127
Second, China claims that Japan actually recognized Chinese
sovereignty over the islands before it seized them in 1895.128 In an
1885 letter, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Inoue Kaoru, advised his
government not to "suddenly establish publicly national boundary
marks" on the islands, as this might "easily invite Chinese
suspicion." 129 Kaoru observed that "those islands are near the
Chinese national boundary" and that "there are Chinese names on
them."130 He concluded by recommending that "[w]ith respect to
the question of establishing national marks, we must wait until the
time is appropriate."' 3' Although Kaoru's letter is not an explicit
acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty, it may reflect the
Japanese government's expectation that China might defend a
preexisting claim, in which case the islands might not be so clearly
terra nullius. Japan's waiting to defeat China before annexing the
Senkakus reveals, China's supporters argue, a strategy for
avoiding otherwise inevitable objections. 132  This argument is
124 Id.
125 An interesting reproduction of the Empress' Decree is found in
SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 184 fig.20.
126 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. V. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser
A/B) No. 43, at 46 (Apr. 5) (noting that "in many cases the tribunal has been
satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of soverign rights,
provided that the other State could not make out a superior claim"). See also
Advisory Opinion on the Status of Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 43, 43 (Apr. 5)
(referencing previous decisions that when control over "thinly populated" areas is
disputed, relatively few acts of sovereignty over the territory can suffice).
127 Heflin, supra note 47, at 4.
128 See Chiu, supra note 3, at 21 (stating that the islands were clearly Chinese
territory when Japan surveyed then in 1895); see also Heflin, supra note 47, at 4
(noting that Japan had "published a map using the same color for the Diayou
Islands and China, while using a different color for the Kingdom of Okinawa").
129 See Chiu, supra note 3, at 21-22 (citing Nihon Gaikou Bunsho (Japanese
Diplomatic Papers), Vol. 18, at 575 (1950)).
130 Id.
131 Id.




bolstered by reference to early Japanese maps showing the
Senkakus to be part of China. 33 Moreover, third party maps of the
nineteenth century period tend to refer to the islands as the Tiao-
yu-tai, favoring the Chinese usage.134 China accordingly argues
that Japan at least implicitly recognized that the Senkakus
belonged to China.
Third, China argues that Japan should have returned the
Senkaku islands after World War II.135 The Chinese view is that
Japan did indeed seize the islands under the terms of the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, which granted Japan "the island of Formosa
[Taiwan], together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the
said island of Formosa."136 For the Chinese to have protested the
loss of a small group of appurtenant islands would arguably have
made little sense when they were ceding an entire province to
Japan. 37 Accordingly, China argues that the Cairo Declaration's
reference to Formosa (Taiwan) should be read to cover the
Senkakus as islands appurtenant to Taiwan.138 It is noted that the
Senkakus are "an extension of the eastern mountain chain of
Taiwan."139 A prewar decision by a Japanese court recognizing the
Senkakus as being "appurtenant" to Formosa/Taiwan may lend
some support to this view, but is likely weakened by fact that both
Taiwan and Okinawa (to which the islands would otherwise
presumably have been attached) were under Japanese control at
China in 1894 to submit a proposal to establish "a national boundary mark" on
the islands).
133 See Chiu, supra note 3, at 20 (describing a Japanese book called Sangoku
Tsuuran Zasetsu (Illustrated Picture of Communication between Three Countries),
published in 1785, and showing the Senkakus to be part of China's Fukien
Province).
134 See Lee, supra note 66, at 13.
135 See Inalienable Part of China's Territory, supra note 19, at 3-4 (noting that
"[a]fter Japan's defeat at the end of World War II, Taiwan was returned to China,
but its subsidiary islands, such as Diaoyu Islands, were placed under trusteeship
of the United States without having previously consulted any concerned
parties.").
136 Treaty of Peace, supra note 116, art. 2. See also Inalienable Part of China's
Territory, supra note 19 (documenting that "Japan had included Diaoyu Islands in
its territory only after obtaining sovereignty over Taiwan and its subsidiary
islands upon signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki").
137 See Inalienable Part of China's Territory, supra note 19 (noting the Treaty of
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the time.140 If the Senkakus were, in fact, part of Taiwan, the U.S.
might have legally erred by unilaterally returning them to Japan in
1972.141 It may have been under an obligation to consult with
China, its World War II ally, as to whether Japan should be
permitted to control the Senkakus.
142
Finally, China has entrenched its claim to the islands through
legislation. Its law on "The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of
the People's Republic of China" formally declares that the
"T'iaoyutai" islands are sovereign Chinese territory." 43
4.3. Evaluating the Competing Claims Under International Law
It is difficult to judge which country has the better claim to the
Senkakus. If the matter were referred to an international body
such as the ICJ, Japan would probably have the stronger doctrinal
argument. Japan holds the islands and administers them and has
had the opportunity to demonstrate its sovereignty through a
variety of forms of government action. By contrast, it is uncertain
whether China's use of the islands as navigational reference points,
or visits by Chinese fishermen amount to exercises of sovereign
authority.144  China's strongest examples of the exercise of
government authority over the Senkakus seem to be their inclusion
140 Heflin, supra note 46, at 18.
141 See Inalienable Part of China's Territory, supra note 19 (declaring that "the US
and Japan made a private agreement to include Diaoyu Islands into the territory
to be returned to Japan" and observing that "the territorial sovereignty of a State
may not, through treaties agreed between third States, be expropriated or
changed"); see also Chiu, supra note 3, at 14-15 (quoting Formal Statement of the
Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Ryukyu Islands and the
T'iaoyutai islets, published in Chung-yang jih-pao (Central Daily News), June 12,
1971, at 1 ("The consistent position of the Republic of China toward the final
disposition of the Ryukyus is: This question should be, in accordance with the
Cairo Declaration ad [sic] Potsdam Declaration, jointly decided among the allies
through consultation.... The Republic of China is a major ally in the war against
Japan and should naturally participate in such consultation, the United States
suddenly decided to return the Ryukyus to Japan, and the Republic of China is
very dissatisfied.")).
142 Politically, of course, this would have been highly unrealistic.
143 See Chiu, supra note 3, at 28 n.74 (citing Chung-huo Jen-min K'ung-kuo Kuo-
wu-yuan K'ung-pao (Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of
China), No. 3, 69-71 (March 13, 1992)) (noting that China has enacted "The
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone" law).
144 See Sovereignty of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.),
2002 I.C.J. 625, para. 132 (Dec. 17) (revisiting the requirements of sovereign




in coastal defense districts and the Dowager Empress' grant to Dr.
Sheng.
The ability of these episodes to establish Chinese sovereignty
under customary international law is uncertain, since nearly four
centuries separate the Empress' decree from the Ming sailors'
battles against Japanese pirates. 45 On the one hand, China and
Japan are ancient societies whose joint history stretches back
millennia. Given that the islands were useless at the time in
question, it is not entirely unreasonable to argue that effective
occupation merely required that the Senkakus be remembered
every few centuries. On the other hand, the passage of centuries
might mean that any claim China had from the Ming era lapsed
long before Japan's twentieth century occupation or was otherwise
wasted away by prescription. Since customary international law
does not necessarily recognize a doctrine of hardship or
extenuating circumstances in such cases, China's effective inability
to protest Japan's annexation of the islands for much of the period
of Japanese control may simply be irrelevant.
1 46
There is thus a colorable case that the islands were indeed terra
nullius at the time of their annexation by Japan, five months before
the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Although the timing is close,
Japan's incorporation of the islands thus seems to be legally
distinct from its annexation of large chunks of Chinese territory
under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Yet even assuming otherwise,
the fact remains that from the end of the Sino-Japanese War to
1931, when Japan again invaded China, and from 1945 to 1971, a
combined period of some 62 years, there is no record of any
Chinese government advancing the slightest claim to the islands.
An argument can thus be made that China and Taiwan acquiesced
in Japan's sovereignty over the islands, and only renewed their
claims when they thought doing so might bring control of nearby
oil supplies.
The two sides' arguments from ancient maps and atlases
probably cancel out, since both countries have made maps that
ostensibly recognize their rival's claims. The mapmakers'
145 SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 61-68.
146 See Clipperton Island Arbitration Award (Fr. v. Mex.), 16 AM. J. INT'L L.
390, 393 (1932) (comparing the futility of Mexico's historic right to the Clipperton
Islands since they had failed to satisfy the international law conditions for
territorial acquisition thus leaving the island in a state of territorium nullius).
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confusion over the islands' status likely reflects the question's
irrelevance at the time that the maps were made.
Yet however well Japan's argument for sovereignty over the
Senkakus succeeds as a technical matter, it has difficulty escaping
the ugly realities of Sino-Japanese history. However Japan parses
the facts, its annexation of the islands occurred at the height of the
Sino-Japanese War. China was in no position to lodge a polite
diplomatic protest while Japan smashed the Chinese army and
navy and seized valuable territories. 147 The Sino-Japanese war
hastened the collapse of the Qing dynasty and pushed China into a
half-century of warlordism, chaos, and Japanese intervention.
China's failure to contest the sovereignty of the Senkaku islands
after World War II is similarly unsurprising. The 1940s and 1950s
were another time of enormous upheaval in China, marked by civil
war and famines that left millions dead. Complicating matters
further, mainland China did not have diplomatic relations with
Japan until 1972.148
A Chinese observer might reasonably insist that his country
was taken advantage of by over nearly a century of exploitation by
foreign powers - of which Japan was but one - and that China
protested as soon as it could. Since 1971, at least, China has done
anything but acquiesce to Japan's control of the Senkakus. An
international adjudication that ignored this historical narrative
would not enjoy much legitimacy in China. If an international
tribunal told them that they should have preserved their rights by
a timely protest in 1895, many Chinese might conclude that Japan
had gotten away with improper imperialist gains because of a legal
technicality.
On the other hand, any litigation between China and Japan
would be a seminal event in international law. Adjudicators
would be conscious that they were deciding the claims of two of
the world's richest and most powerful countries. Far more would
be at stake than the subject matter in the cases that would serve as
likely precedents, such as the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, a
relatively friendly disagreement over who should have sovereignty
147 There are few comprehensive histories of the Sino-Japanese War available
in English. The best account available appears to be STEWART LONE, JAPAN'S FIRST
MODERN WAR (1994).
148 See Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People's
Republic of China, Japan-P.R.C., Aug. 12, 1978, 1225 U.N.T.S. 269 (Extending
diplomatic recognition from Japan to the People's Republic of China over the




over small islands in the English Channel149 The panel's views
about the proper time scales to apply, and the propriety of
excusing China's arguable failure to timely protest Japan's actions
on the islands would likely determine the outcome.
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S UNHELPFUL ROLE IN THE SENKAKU
ISLANDS DISPUTE
Current international law may ultimately offer no clear answer
to the question of which country should be sovereign over the
Senkakus.150 However, the applicable international law regimes
seem to have done much to make the dispute persist as long, and
as dangerously, as it has.
5.1. Tying Resources to Rights
First, the international law of the sea has caused sovereignty
over the Senkakus to be worth much more than the islands
themselves.
Japan and China are no longer interested in guano or rare
herbs. The islands' value is almost entirely in the offshore EEZs
that UNCLOS presumably attaches to them. These zones are an
entirely artificial legal construction. As such, the dispute over the
islands provides a good example of how universal multilateral
regimes can have dangerous unintended consequences.' 5' By
projecting a 200 nautical mile EEZ from the world's coastlines,
UNCLOS tried to solve the international problems that seemed
important at the time it was drafted. The UNCLOS rules turned
out as they did in part because developing nations wanted to
project their new-found sovereignty over increasingly scarce
offshore resources. 152 The "Cod Wars" of the 1960s and early 70s,
149 See The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (U.K. v. Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).
150 See SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 42 (acknowledging the "failure of
international law" in the Senkaku islands dispute).
151 See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilaterialism, and the Architecture of
International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming Issue 2) (critiquing the efficacy
of multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, arrangements, which can better reflect the
political and strategic realities of two particular states).
152 See EDWARD L. MILES, GLOBAL OCEAN POLITICS: THE DECISION PROCESS AT
THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1973-1982, at 18-
21 (Martinus Nijhoff 1998) (explaining that the UNCLOS negotiations were a
North-South "fight to redistribute ownership and control over world ocean
resources" and that for the less maritime developing nations participating in the
negotiations, "the symbolic issues were paramount").
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in which the Icelandic Coast Guard and Royal Navy tussled over
Iceland's attempts to exclude British trawlers from a 200 nautical
mile exclusive zone (analogous to an EEZ) were emblematic of the
problems the UNCLOS drafters hoped to solve. 5 3 The participants
that prevailed in the UNCLOS negotiations generally entered the
conference concerned that offshore zones were too narrow, rather
than too wide.15 4 Since the Japanese and Chinese delegations seem
not to have played a prominent part at the conference, it is
unsurprising that the problems of East Asia's narrow seas did not
figure prominently in the drafting of the treaty.155 Thus, while
UNCLOS' provision for a 200 nautical mile EEZ may have served
the goals of its dominant drafters, it has been a major cause of
trouble in the Senkakus.
This is not to suggest that the East China Sea would be free of
Sino-Japanese tensions if sovereignty over the Senkakus were not
such an important prize. The seas are narrow, and Japan and
China might well contest the proper location of the dividing line
between their EEZs even if the Senkakus sank into the sea.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that the tone of the
dispute would be much milder if physical land territory were not
at stake. Land is almost always seen as a core national interest and
has ready emotional appeal. 5 6 It is sovereign territory, an actual
153 See HANNES JONSSON, FRIENDS IN CONFLICT: THE ANGLO-ICELANDIC COD
WARS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 189-204 (Archon Books 1982) (placing Iceland's
actions in the Cod Wars in the context of a shift in international law away from a
colonialist school of thought favoring maximal freedom of the seas and minimal
zones of offshore jurisdiction, towards a progressive school in which states have
greater sovereign rights over offshore resources which contributed directly to the
establishment of a 200 nautical mile EEZ in UNCLOS).
154 See UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN
AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1998), http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention-agreements/convention historical-perspective.htm (noting that
wider maritime endowments were favored by "smaller States and those not
possessing large, ocean-going navies or merchant fleets" and that "87 per cent of
all known and estimated hydrocarbon reserves under the sea fall under some
national jurisdiction as a result" of UNCLOS' EEZ regime).
155 See MILES, supra note 152, at 24-25 (stating that there were "few, if any,
common interests" between Japan and the rest of the "Asian Group" in which it
was placed for the negotiations and that "China... had little expertise on law of
the sea matters [and] ... sought instead to embarrass the Soviet Union wherever
possible"). It is interesting to speculate whether the presence of today's more
economically than ideologically focused China would have made a difference at
the conference.




part of the country that owns it. EEZs are not part of a country in
quite the same way, but are merely stretches of ocean and sea
bottom over which a particular country enjoys added privileges.157
Given that no postwar Chinese government took the least interest
in the islands until after the United Nations survey, the
sovereignty dispute might never even have arisen but for the
international law of offshore rights.
The timing of China's first protestations of sovereignty over the
Senkakus makes it highly implausible that their prime motivation
was anything other than a chance at the area's potential
hydrocarbon wealth.58 The structure of the international law of
the sea encouraged China to pursue this goal by deploying
symbolically rich and ideologically potent arguments about
sovereignty. Coupling the issue of sovereignty over the islands (a
mostly symbolic issue) with access to the East China Sea's energy
resources (an entirely pragmatic issue) has made it extremely
difficult to make progress on either.
Japan and China have proven their ability to work together on
economic matters. 59 Japanese and Chinese oil companies have
admitted that they would like to cooperate in the East China Sea.160
Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RES. 829, 829 (2002) (observing
that "[slovereign control over territory has long been considered the
quintessential feature of modem statehood. No issue is more likely to stimulate
nationalist sentiments or to lead to violent interstate conflict than disputes over
territory").
157 UNCLOS does not grant countries sovereignty over EEZs, but merely
allows them to exercise a limited number of "sovereign rights," subject to
countervailing privileges for the vessels of third party nations. See UNCLOS,
supra note 14, at art. 58 (preserving the rights of others in the exclusive economic
zone). Since UNCLOS does not allow states to exclude each other from EEZs, it
cannot fairly be said to create actual sovereignty.
158 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, supra note 78 (indicating that
China did not protest supposed encroachments upon Chinese territory until rights
to natural resources were at stake).
159 See, e.g., Paul Blustein, China Passes U.S. in Trade with Japan, WASH. POST,
Jan. 27, 2005, at E01 (documenting when China overtook the United States as
Japan's largest trading partner); Japan's Trade with China Rose in 2006 for 8th
Consecutive Year, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2007/03/09/business/AS-FIN-ECO-apan-China-Trade.php (describing trade
statistics between Japan, the United States, and China in 2006).
160 See Susumu Yarita, Toward Cooperation in the East China Sea, in HARRISON,
supra note 5, at 23-29. Yarita, the Managing Director of Uruma Resources
Exploration Co., Ltd., a Japanese firm, describes his company's negotiations with
China's CNOOC. Id. The companies hoped to agree on a joint development area
in the East China Sea, but were ultimately stopped because of political
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Unfortunately, this spirit of cooperation has not extended to issues
touching on sovereignty and security. Neither government can
easily abandon or moderate its claim because a point of
sovereignty is a point of principle. 161  A government risks
illegitimacy when it does not appear to be defending a nation's
territorial integrity and respect among its neighbors. Although
China has been willing to accept unfavorable boundary
agreements for the sake of overall relations with its other
neighbors, doing so will be particularly difficult in its dealings
with Japan, given the powerful strain of anti-Japanese nationalism
in Chinese political ideology. 162 Japanese leaders are similarly
unwilling to appear weak in their defense of Japan's territorial
claims. Thus, so long as the international law of the sea ties a
pragmatic resource agreement to a perceived issue of principle, the
governments will have difficulty creating the mutually beneficial
arrangements, perhaps a Joint Development Zone (JDZ), upon
which friendlier powers might already have agreed. 63
5.2. A Framework for Ratcheting Escalation
Second, international law has provided a framework for
ratcheting escalation of the dispute.
interference. Id. After several false starts, "both sides decided to await the
outcome of official negotiations on the Senkakus (Tiao Yu Tai) and EEZ before
resuming dialogue on joint operations." Id at 26.
161 See Simmons, supra note 156, at 829.
162 See M. Taylor Fravel, Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation:
Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes, 30 INT'L SEcuRITY 46, 46-83
(2005) (detailing China's boundary settlements with Burma, Nepal, India, North
Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and noting that "[s]ince 1949, China has settled
seventeen of its twenty-three territorial disputes" and usually has been willing to
accept "less than 50 percent of the contested land"). See also GRIES, supra note 81,
at 69-85 (describing how war with Japan has shaped China's national identity).
163 Both sides claim to favor joint development. The problem is that agreeing
upon an area for joint development begs the question of which areas of the East
China Sea fall exclusively within China's or Japan's EEZ and, consequently, that
of sovereignty over the Senkakus. According to HARRISON, supra note 5, at 9, a
major sticking point has been "the conflict between Japan's desire for a joint zone
that straddles the hypothetical median line [claimed by Japan]... and China's
position that the zone should be limited to areas on the Japanese side of the line."
Although Japan makes no claim west of this median line, it is not surprising that
the Japanese government should be reluctant to be the only side seeming to share
something. See also Atsuko Kawasaki, Latest East China Sea Talks End Without Deal,
PLArS OILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 26, 2008. at 4 (discussing Japan's rejection of China's




It is much easier for either government to insist upon its claims
than to back away from them. International law has armed
nationalist groups with a powerful rhetoric of rights and
entitlements. 6 4 The activities of the Japanese Youth Federation, a
leading nationalist organization, are a case in point. When the
Federation builds a lighthouse on the Senkakus, and then demands
that its construction be acknowledged on official Japanese charts,
the group is challenging the government in Tokyo to ratify its
actions.165 If the government agrees, the Federation's actions are
probably transformed into assertions of Japanese sovereignty. 66 If
the government refuses, it will be accused of weakness in the face
of Chinese bullying. Since China naturally protests the
Federation's activities, the Japanese government's refusal to ratify
them would risk appearing to accept the legitimacy of China's
claims.167
Once the Japanese government ratifies its citizens'
provocations, however, a similar dilemma confronts China, though
more strongly. Since China does not control the islands, it must
protest vigorously, lest it should appear to acquiesce in Japan's
occupation of the islands.168 The result is a series of escalatory
gestures. At each stage, governments face pressure to preserve
their legal claims and political legitimacy through taking actions
that trigger responses in kind. The 1978 Senkaku Incident, noted
above, is an excellent example of this process. As the price of their
support for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and
China, right-wing members of the Japanese Diet pressured a
government spokesman into asserting that China's claim to the
Senkakus was ridiculous. 69 China responded, as noted above, by
issuing angry denunciations and dispatching a fleet of armed
vessels to the islands 70
164 See, e.g., supra Sections 4.1-4.2.
165 The Youth Federation has not confined itself to building lighthouses. See,
e.g., Taipei Demands Japan Remove Shinto Shrine from Disputed Isle, KYODO NEWS
INT'L, May 8, 2000, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
nil_mOWDQ/is_2000 May)8/ai_62170600.
166 On aids to navigation as effectivitds of sovereignty, see Case Concerning
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001 I.C.J. 75, 137 (Mar. 16).
167 See discussion of prescription and acquiescence, supra Section 2.2.
168 Id.
169 See Tretiak, supra note 99, at 1241.
170 Id. at 1242.
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This pattern of hostile gestures over the Senkaku islands is, of
course, far from the only theme in relations between Asia's two
great powers. Neither government wants matters to get out of
hand and lead to actual armed conflict. Regulating nationalistic
activity is somewhat easier for China, where freedom of expression
is not prized. Thus, while condemning Japanese activity in the
Senkakus as a "gross violation" of Chinese sovereignty, the
Chinese government has simultaneously denied permits for anti-
Japanese protests, and even detained the leaders of anti-Japanese
nationalist organizations.'7 ' Although tens of thousands of
Chinese have rallied against Japan's occupation of the Senkakus in
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, such events are usually
suppressed in mainland China.172 Efforts to restrain the Chinese
public's fervent anti-Japanese sentiment have provoked serious
internal dissent, with some newspapers even accusing the
government of a lack of patriotism in its dealings with Japan.173
Beijing cannot press too hard.
Accordingly, Beijing and Tokyo find themselves trying to
dampen the fires of nationalism, even while they cannot and do
not want to extinguish them. The recent decision to install a
"hotline" connection between the Japanese Self Defense Forces'
Joint Staff Office and the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Army
General Staff Headquarters reflects this dilemma. 174 Much as the
United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, Japan
and China have tacitly acknowledged that a degree of military
confrontation is inevitable. They are acting less to end that
171 Downs & Saunders, supra note 80, at 137-39. See also Anthony Spaeth,
Nationalism Gone Awry: Death in the Diaoyus, TIME INT'L, Oct. 7, 1996, available at
http://www.time.com/time/international/1996/961007/diaoyu.html
(describing a Chinese protest over Japan's claim to the island when four activists
jumped overboard to symbolically claim the waters).
172 Downs & Saunders, supra note 80, at 135-36.
173 Id. at 139.
174 Hotline to Link SDF, China's PLA Planned/Govt Aims to Prevent Air, Sea






confrontation than to try to keep it from spiraling out of control.175
This can be a dangerous policy.
5.3. Encouraging Legal Claims But Discouraging Legal Answers
Third, international law has failed to provide an attractive
institutional framework for Japan and China to resolve their
differences over the islands.
Even where the international legal system seems to provide a
legitimate framework for stating a claim, it may not enjoy enough
legitimacy in a country's internal politics to make adverse
outcomes tolerable. Human nature being what it is, rules often
seem much more legitimate when construed to favor one's own
interests than the reverse. In the absence of an enforcement
mechanism, unwelcome legal decisions will not be accepted when
the parties - in this case, China and Japan - care more deeply about
their disputed entitlements than about treating a ruling as
binding.176 If, as here, ignoring an adverse decision would have
severe political and diplomatic consequences, the parties may
simply insist that the law is on their side but decline to put it to the
test.
As we have seen, the vagueness of the international customary
law of territorial acquisition encourages both sides to ground their
claims in colorable legal arguments. Customary international
law's ability to be all things to all parties betrays its dubious worth.
All lawsuits involve a degree of uncertainty, but international
sovereignty claims are especially chancy. Even if a court or arbitral
panel chose to consider itself bound by decisions in past cases,
there are simply too few cases and too many uncertain variables
for the result of any adjudication of sovereignty over the Senkakus
to be reliably predicted.177 Academic solutions to the puzzle of the
175 For an extensive treatment of governments' willingness to negotiate the
management, rather than resolution of armed rivalries, see generally GABRIELLA
BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES (2007)
(arguing that peace and war are seldom polar totalities but increasingly can and
do coexist within the confines of a single scenario).
176 See generally Simmons, supra note 156, at 837 (finding that noncompliance
with arbitral boundary decisions had occurred in about a third of post World War
II cases surveyed).
177 Stare decisis does not formally bind the International Court of Justice. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.I.A.S. No. 993 ("The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case."). That said, past decisions are
frequently cited as authority in the court's decisions. Their role is similar to that
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islands' ownership tend to be overly formalistic or noticeably
colored by nationalism.178 Given these formidable uncertainties, it
is unsurprising that the two sides have not sought to litigate or
arbitrate the islands' status.
179
Perhaps aware of the difficulties of its case under customary
international law, China has refrained from trying to take Japan to
court. Losing, particularly against Japan, would seriously
undermine the Chinese Communist Party's status as the guardian
of China's rights and prestige. Winning might be problematic as
well. Short of war, there would be no way for China to be sure that
Japan would actually turn over the islands if it lost in court.
Japan would seem to have even less incentive to go to court.
Japan already controls the islands; legal proceedings could only
jeopardize a position of strength. An adverse decision might force
Japan to choose between antagonizing an emboldened China and
losing access to much of the East China Sea's hydrocarbon
resources, as well as losing face at home. Blatant refusal to comply
with an international judgment would also undermine a half
century's efforts to repackage Japan as a law-abiding member of
the international community.180
of past decisions of the United States Supreme Court, by which the Court
considers itself bound until it decides not to be.
178 See, e.g., Heflin, supra note 47, at 21-22 (applying an extremely formalist
account of the customary international law to conclude that Japan's "post-War
peaceful exercise of actual authority over the islands had extinguished China's
long historical claim"); see also Chiu, supra note 3, at 28 (concluding that "the law
apparently favors the Chinese side" on the basis of a strained reading of the
Potsdam and Cairo Declarations, ancient maps and Taiwanese geography).
179 See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 187 (2d
ed. 1979) (explaining that countries often decline to take cases before the ICJ
because of "reluctance by political officials to let their interests in a dispute get out
of the control of their own diplomacy for final determination by others" and
further observing that "nations will not adjudicate matters which, they feel, they
could not afford to lose or where, if they lost, they could not afford to obey the
judgment"). See generally Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining
Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 303
(2002) (discussing why dispute resolution is uncommon among international
disputes).
180 INOGUCHI, supra note 86, at 180. In recent talks, Japan reportedly
suggested submitting the demarcation of offshore zones in the East China Sea to
an international tribunal. See Yihe, Olympian Efforts to Keep the Peace, supra note
104. It is hard to gauge how serious the Japanese proposal may have been, since
China quickly rejected it. Id. At any rate, litigating or arbitrating the demarcation
of offshore zones would be a far cry from asking an international panel to




If these considerations discourage the parties from litigating,
they provide equally little inducement for them to bargain "in the
shadow of the law." Bargaining "in the shadow of the law" is a
process by which parties negotiate an agreement based on their
differing risk preferences in the face of potential litigation.181 Such
bargaining is hardly unique to domestic litigation. Countries
bargain this way as well, particularly in the area of international
trade, where states may most strongly recognize the legitimacy of
international rules and face a credible threat of enforcement.182
However, bargaining in the shadow of the law can only work
when the parties share "relatively similar expectations about the
opportunities and risks" of litigation or arbitration and understand
the "bargaining endowments" granted them by the applicable
law. 83 They must also be confident that each would, if necessary,
accept the jurisdiction and the judgment of an adjudicating body.
These conditions do not apply in the case of the Senkaku
islands. Forecasting the likely actions of an international legal
body is more difficult than predicting what a domestic court will
do against the background of extensively developed case law, the
context in which the theory of bargaining in the shadow of the law
first developed. 84 Furthermore, the result of any adjudication
would all but inevitably be attacked as illegitimate by the losing
side.185 The Chinese or Japanese public might reasonably ask why
their country's sovereign rights over vast resources should be
181 See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 950 (1979) (discussing
"the impact of the legal system on negotiations and bargains that occur outside
the courtroom"); Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of
International Law, supra note 151, at 43 (applying the idea of "bargaining in the
shadow of the law" in the international context, and suggesting that countries
may reach bilateral agreements by "bargaining in the shadow" of multilateral
regimes).
182 See generally Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 158 (2000)
(describing bargaining in the context of GATT/WTO dispute resolution).
183 See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ScoTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 106
(2000) ; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 181, at 968 (describing how legal rules
create bargaining endowments).
184 Id.
185 See Simmons, supra note 156, at 835 (warning that when a country loses a
territorial case before an international court "disaffected groups [may] oppose the
outcome and begin to denounce the legal process and maybe the government
itself").
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determined according to legal rules that emerged from relatively
unimportant nineteenth century disputes between Western
powers.186 Although China and Japan operate with the modern
international legal system, they assuredly did not invent it, and as
civilizations they predate it. Accepting the judgment, and perhaps
even the jurisdiction, of an international adjudicatory panel might
also conflict with the feelings of national pride that have inflamed
the Senkaku dispute. That a judgment as to sovereignty over the
Senkakus would not be accepted is, in a sense, evidenced by the
fact that neither side has sought one. In the end, the apparatus of
international justice appears incapable of resolving the Senkaku
islands dispute.
5.4. A Dangerous Stalemate
Other forces, particularly nationalist rivalry and the
countervailing desire to profit from trade and economic
cooperation, almost certainly have more influence upon the
broader Sino-Japanese relationship than international law does.
Nevertheless, insofar as international legal regimes have worked to
entrench the Senkaku islands dispute, they may have helped
perpetuate a serious threat to East Asia's peace and security.
At present, Tokyo and Beijing both profess willingness to share
the East China Sea's offshore resources, provided, of course, that
the sovereignty issue can be settled on their terms. A joint
communiqu6 issued by the two governments after high-level
meetings in April 2007, affirmed their commitment to "a strategic
relationship of mutual benefit" and pledged joint "consultations"
on making the East China Sea "a sea of peace, cooperation and
186 Nigeria's official reaction to the ICJ's ruling in the Nigeria-Cameroon
Border Demarcation case illustrates the kind of attacks which can be made upon
the legitimacy of the court and of its judgments by appealing to historical
circumstances, as creating a higher law than the customary international law
applied by the ICJ. See Press Release, Embassy of the Fed. Republic of Nig. in
Washington, D.C., Nigeria's Reaction to the Judgment of the International Court
of Justice at The Hague (Nigeria, Cameroon with Equatorial Guinea Intervening)
(Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/110802_1.shtml
(insisting that French, English and German Judges should have disqualified
themselves because "as citizens of the colonial powers whose action [in creating
modem Africa's boundaries] had come under scrutiny, [they] acted as judges in
their own cause and thereby rendered their judgment virtually null and void").
The relevant case is Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 325 (Oct. 10).
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friendship." 187 Though these exchanges may have been good for
Sino-Japanese relations in the short term, it is proving extremely
difficult for China and Japan to vindicate their lofty rhetoric. 188
Indeed, subsequent working-level talks between the two countries
have stalled. Indeed, by the end of 2007, Japan and China had
already held at least eleven fruitless rounds of negotiations over
their maritime boundary. 89 Japanese and Chinese negotiators
agree on the desirability of an agreement but acknowledge that
they have been unable to resolve the "basic points" of a
compromise. 190 Vague and continuing promises to reach an
agreement over development of the area's gas resources must be
discounted accordingly, given the two governments' essential
intransigence. 19' Crucially, neither government has even suggested
that it might renounce its claim to the Senkakus. As such, any
agreement reached over resources will be inherently unstable and
continually threatened by nationalist flare-ups over the unresolved
sovereignty of the Senkakus 9
2
187 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the P.R.C., China-Japan Joint
Press Communiqu6 (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://chinaembassy.org.nz/
eng/zxxx/t311005.htm (marking Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan).
188 See id. Although the mood of the China-Japan Joint Communiqu6 is
extremely positive, it does not commit the sides to any concrete concessions. The
Communiqu6 pledges "high-level visits," the establishment of a "China-Japan
high-level economic dialogue mechanism," "people-to-people and youth
contacts," "a China-Japan [e]xchange [y]ear of [c]ulture and [s]ports," and "a
ministerial dialogue on energy policy." Id. The communique's most important
provisions are for "consultations" about the possibility of a Joint Development
Zone in the East China Sea, an agreement by Japan to work harder at disposing of
World War II era chemical weapons left in China by Japanese forces, and port
visits to Japan and China by each other's navies.
189 See Takeo Kumagai, East China Sea Talks Schedule Unsettled After Japan's
Cabinet Shakeup, PLATrS OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 29, 2007, at 2 (describing Japan's
efforts to renew bilateral talks); see also Signing of Japan-China Accord on Delimiting
Gas Deposits Improbable, ITAR-TASS, Dec. 18, 2007 (predicting failure of the
agreement).
190 See Japan, China Grow Apart Over Gas Row, Agree to Compile Plan by Fall,
JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, June 26, 2007 (reporting the difficulty in reaching
consensus).
191 See, e.g., Mure Dickie & David Pilling, Beijing Sees End to Gas Dispute with
Japan, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 2008, at 5 (providing evidence of dispute impasses).
192 See id. (quoting Japanese and Chinese observers suggesting that the
governments are looking for a "deliberately ambiguous" agreement that would
allow development of the area's gas reserves "without ceding ground on territorial or
legal questions" (emphasis added)).
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Unfortunately, the prospects for a genuine and peaceful
settlement of the islands' status may only grow worse over time.
The problem is that oil and gas supplies are both finite and in
rising demand. As Japanese and Chinese energy demand
continues to grow, inevitable decreases in fossil fuel supplies-or
instability in exporting countries - might make the two
governments increasingly reluctant to share natural resources.193
China is already noted for its "mercantilist" attitude to energy
security and its distrust of markets. 94 Japan has already gone to
war for oil once in the past century. Were serious supply shortages
to strike the world economy, the wealth attached to the Senkakus
might become an increasingly attractive prize. If either side were
thirsty enough for oil, the unsettled questions of international law
surrounding the islands might furnish a pretext for violent
resource conflict. China might cite Japanese provocations and
invasions of its sovereignty to justify seizing the islands and the
resources around them by force. Alternatively, Japan might use
force against Chinese protestors in ways that precipitated an
armed response by China.
193 On the inevitability of fossil fuel depletion, see generally KENNETH S.
DEFFEYEs, HUBBERT'S PEAK: THE IMPENDING WORLD OIL SHORTAGE (2001); MATTHEW
SIMMONS, TWILIGHT IN THE DESERT: THE COMING SAUDI OIL SHOCK AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY (2005) and Totally Different, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 2008 (including an
interview with Christophe de Margerie, CEO of French oil major Total, who
believes that world oil production will not be able to meet demand over the next
two decades). Although the controversy surrounding "peak oil" theory is beyond
the scope of this paper, the debate is ultimately about timelines. All experts
recognize that oil and gas are ultimately finite resources. Cf. Cambridge Energy
Research Associates, Why the "Peak Oil" Theory Falls Down - Myths, Legends, and the
Future of Oil Resources, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://cera.ecnext.
com/coms2/summary_0236-821_ITM (finding "no evidence of a peak before
2030").
194 See Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson & Lyle J. Goldstein, Chinese
Naval Analysts Consider the Energy Question, in MARITIME IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S
ENERGY STRATEGY, supra note 77, at 122, 124 (describing a "mercantilist" Chinese
energy security strategy "based on the zero-sum premise that oil supplies are
running out" and that "entails paying whatever it takes to secure access to
reserves, emphasizing bilateral state-to-state deals, and building up a military
force that can secure one's energy supply lines"). See also KENNETH LIEBERTHAL &
MIKKAL HERBERG, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH ANALYSIS, CHINA'S
SEARCH FOR ENERGY SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 14(Apr. 2006), available
at http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol17no1.pdf (explaining that
the "mercantilist cast" of China's energy strategy "reflects China's sense of
weakness and vulnerability regarding reliable access to energy supplies ...
provides the rationale for direct state intervention and support" and "is strongly




These dangers are not unique. As world oil prices continue to
rise over time, governments will be willing to go further, spend
more money, and run greater risks to ensure a supply of energy to
their economies. There is no shortage of cases in which the
dangers of bundling emotional questions of sovereignty with
offshore energy rights present ominous portents. In the South
China Sea, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and
Taiwan continue to vie for control of another strategic flashpoint,
the Spratly islands. Like the Senkakus, the Spratlys are thought to
project offshore rights to rich deposits of oil.19 In another example,
the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that as much as a quarter of
the world's undiscovered oil and gas may lie in the warming
Arctic.1 96 As the icecaps melt, the United States, Russia, Norway,
Canada and Denmark have begun to slip into high-stakes maritime
disputes.197 Russia, for example, sent an expedition to the North
Pole in August of 2007 to reinforce its claim to sovereignty over all
of the Arctic Ocean between Siberia and the North Pole. 98
On the other side of the world, hunger for energy may also be
rekindling the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas) that led to war in 1982. Argentine President
Nestor Kirchner recently pulled out of a 1995 agreement to share
rights to any oil found in the seas between the British Falklands
and Argentina and denounced the United Kingdom's "unilateral"
exploration for oil in the region. 99 The British government, for its
195 See MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL
CONFLICT 109-38 (2001) (describing resource conflicts over the Spratly Islands).
196 See generally Doug Mellgren, Riches Await as Earth's Icy North Melts, USA
TODAY, Mar. 24, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2007-
03-25-melting-northN.htm (describing that the "international race for oil ... [is]
accelerated by the impact of global warming) ; Beth Gorham, Muscling in on the
Arctic; U.S. Icebreakers Urged to Counter Canadian Flag-Waving, DAILY HERALD-
TRIBUNE (Grande Prairie, Alberta), Sept. 29, 2006, at 47 (describing U.S. scientists'
arguments that the United States needs to do more to access oil supplies in the
Artic).
197 Id.
198 See James Graff, Fight for the Top Of the World, TIME, Sept. 19, 2007, at 39
(reporting that the Russian expedition actually planted a Russian flag on the
seabed below the North Pole).
199 See Monte Reel, Falkland Islands An Unsettled Issue 25 Years After War;
Contending Claims by Argentina, Britain Burden Relations as Anniversary Nears,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2007, at All (illustrating the contending claims of Argentina
and Britain); Sophie Arie, Argentina Scraps Falkland Oil Agreement, THE TELEGRAPH,
Mar. 29, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
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part (as of the time of writing), appears to be preparing a massive
submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf which would support Britain's claim to extend its
economic rights in the South Atlantic beyond the UNCLOS treaty's
default 200 nautical miles.200 The proposal has sparked outrage in
Argentina and coincided - perhaps not coincidentally - with the
deployment of a Royal Marines unit to the islands.201
International law may yet help to prevent these and similar
disagreements from turning into armed conflict. International
lawyers should nevertheless be sensitive to the possibility that
international law's frequent bundling of access to offshore
resources with disputes over sovereignty may have dangerous
results. In every case, of course, the varying resonance of
nationalist appeals in the countries concerned, the parties'
respective willingness to gamble their claims in international legal
proceedings, and the value, or supposed value, of the resources at
stake, will impact how effectively and peacefully disputes are
resolved.
6. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
In advancing these arguments about how international law
may have rendered the Senkaku dispute more intractable and
more dangerous, this paper does not mean to suggest that there is
no place for international law in sovereignty and resources
disputes. The hope is, rather, that pointing out the shortcomings of
the international legal system in one case will help make it stronger
and more effective in the future. It is important to consider the
questions posed without leaping to conclusions:
main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/28/wfalksl28.xml (signaling the deteriorating
relations between the two countries).
200 Oliver Balch & Colin Freeman, Argentina Fury at UK Bid for Falkland Seas,
THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 23, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/09/23/wfalk23.xml. See also UNCLOS,
supra note 14, at art. 76(8) (outlining guidelines for changes to the outer limits of
the continental shelf).
201 See Royal Marines Back in the Falklands for [sic] Exercise Commando Strike,
MERCOPRESS, Sept. 28, 2007, available at http://www.mercopress.com/
vemoticia.do?id=11478&formato=html (noting the British government's
explanation that the Marines have been deployed to train for operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq). The timing seems significant nonetheless. The exercise





For example, UNCLOS's likely attachment of a vast offshore
jurisdiction to the otherwise worthless Senkaku islands tempts the
conclusion that EEZs and other maritime jurisdictional areas
should be trimmed closer to shore. This may be mistaken. In
disputes prior to the UNCLOS Convention, it was precisely the
lack of extensive offshore rights that triggered maritime tensions.202
One size does not fit all. A better approach may be to deemphasize
the universality of the law of offshore rights in favor of regional
and bilateral accords. These could be better tailored to the
geography of a given maritime area.203 Had regional governments
negotiated a Convention on the "Law of East Asian Seas" they
would probably have chosen a figure lower than 200 nautical miles
as the standard EEZ projection.
That disputes over territory can provoke increasingly hostile
"displays" of sovereign authority may be beyond the power of the
international legal community to solve. A "United Nations
Convention On Sovereignty Over Obscure Territories" is unlikely
to succeed or to remedy the dangerous vagueness of this area of
international law. The only solution may lie in conscious efforts by
governments, international civil society, and individuals concerned
with preserving peace to deemphasize the relevance of the concept
of "sovereignty" to intrinsically worthless and uninhabited
territories.
As to the failure of the parties to avail themselves of the
international judicial system, it seems unreasonable to expect states
to submit matters of major national interest to tribunals of dubious
legitimacy that apply fuzzy law. Over the long term, it may be
healthier for the international legal community to acknowledge the
inadequacies of the customary law of territorial acquisition and
admit that there is no real law governing many such disputes. In
the case of the Senkakus, regional stability might be better served
by throwing away the Dowager Empress' musty decrees and
engaging in old fashioned pie-slicing unencumbered by the
divisive language of legal entitlements.
202 See supra notes 153, 154 (describing the development of the UNCLOS
regime).
203 Universalist approaches may be more appropriate in those areas of the
Law of the Sea that are not geographically contingent, such as navigation rights
and the rights of flag and port states over vessels within their jurisdiction.
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Finally, the best solutions to the world's resource conflicts may
lie outside of the legal sphere. Just as the 1968 United Nations
study vested the Senkakus with an importance they had never had,
the efficient development of nuclear, solar, and other alternative
fuel sources might reduce demand for hard-to-extract undersea oil
and gas, calming resource conflicts in the Senkakus and other
zones of contention.
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